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SOE and the reasons for Public Style accountability  
Accountability is certainly one of the concepts referred to most often in accounting literature, 
but it is also—perhaps for that very reason—among the most ambiguously defined concepts 
(Sinclair 1995).3 Yet the term’s etymology is relatively simple. To account for something 
means to cite the reasons that explain a certain behaviour (Roberts & Scapens 1985; Thynne 
& Goldring 1987; Jones 1992).   
The chameleonic nature the concept acquires under the different definitions suggested 
for it (Sinclair 1995) is most likely due not to different interpretations of the term, but to the 
variability of the objectives assigned to people who are required to account for their 
behaviour (“accountors”), and to the variability of the cognitive and control priorities of the 
people (“accountees”) to whom account is supposed to be given (Van Thiel 2000).4  
It is probably this circumstance that explains the main differences normally attributed to 
the concept of accountability in the private sector and the public sector. Actually, while in 
both cases it always means ‘to answer for something’, the profound differences that may exist 
in the purposes assigned to the accountors and in the cognitive and control needs deriving 
from the different nature of the resources used can entail changes in the forms and contents 
of the necessary reporting instruments.  
As to the purpose, when gaining a profit is the one that prevails, as it is mostly (though 
not exclusively5) the case in the private sector, reporting is greatly simplified. People running 
a profit orientated entity are asked to create value for its investors and, since in a monetary 
economy this means assuring stockholders that they can earn more money than they invested, 
the more that cash flows are generated, the higher the value created for the investors. Thus 
the contents, the forms and the rules governing reporting instruments are aligned to the need 
to represent a business’s capacity to create cash (IASB 2010, par. OB3).6  
If an entity’s purpose is not to turn a profit, as is typically the case in public-sector, 
reporting is more complicated (Hughes 1992).7 If a company sells its output at a price that 
does not reflect its fair market value, or just gives its goods or services away, then its 
economic balance cannot be defined in terms of financial remuneration of invested capital 
(Walker 1989; Pallot 1992; Airoldi et al. 2005; D’Alessio 2008; Marchi 2011).8 Measuring 
the value the entity creates for its owners becomes decidedly more complex (Capaldo 1995; 
Borgonovi 2005). The degree to which entities achieve the purposes assigned to them—in 
particular entities delivering essential services—cannot indeed be measured by quantifying 
their past and future cash flows.9 This situation requires the development of broader sets of 
                                                          
3 Many different meanings have been attributed to the term, and they often spill over into areas traditionally 
reserved for other concepts, such as responsibility, ethics, professional standards, or control. The idea of 
accountability has even been used to evoke images of reliability, loyalty and justice, or as a synonym for good 
government (Mulgan 2000; Van Thiel 2000; Bovens 2007). 
4 As early as a century ago, the literature clearly recognised that even within the sphere of private for-profit 
enterprises, each different cognitive need was matched by just as many financial statements (Pantaleoni 1904). 
5 As Farneti notes (2007, p. 12), “[A] public-sector company is not necessarily a not-for-profit company, and a 
private-sector company is not necessarily a for-profit company”. 
6 This is consistent with the purpose of business enterprises, which—as clearly recognized by the FASB in its 
conceptual framework—is “to invest cash in non-cash resources to earn more cash” (FASB 1978, part. 139). 
7 Although a change of purpose does not necessarily change a  company’s essential features, the company is and 
always remains a “production fact” (Cavalieri 2010 p. 128) to which all the traditional principles of accounting 
and business economics continue to apply (Farneti 2000, p. 512; Viganò 2000, pp. 674-677;  Catturi 2003). 
8 Generally speaking, the people to whom public-sector reporting is addressed are not interested in weighing 
different ways of allocating their resources;  rather, they feel a need to judge the performance of managers who 
are responsible for productive operations that cannot be abandoned (Lennard 2007; Australian Accounting 
Standards Board et al. 2006; Mack & Ryan 2006).  Consistently, the IPSASB (2010), in its proposal for a 
conceptual-framework, placed decidedly more emphasis on the evaluation of directors (stewardship) than did 
FASB and IASB in their framework for the private sector.  
9 Even the identification of the economic entity to be satisfied seems anything but immediate (Ricci 2010).   
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indicators that go beyond the logic of accounting income anchored to the financial effects of 
business transactions. Focusing on the substantive aspects of the production process can 
attempt to measure separately the degree to which the different purposes assigned are 
satisfied (Brealey et al. 1997).10   
The nature of resources employed can also greatly affect contents and form of 
accountability. When the origin of the funds used and raised by an entity are in the public 
sphere, this surely enhances the perception and relevance of the obligations of lawfulness 
compared with what happens in the private sphere. A large part of the cognitive interest is 
shifted from the results to the manner of production, in particular to their level of lawfulness 
and transparency. The ethical dimension is certainly heightened, and in those circumstances 
where the end can never justify the means, those that do not comply fully with the law run 
foul of the shared judgment of the community to which their output is delivered.11 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are quite a wide concept, since they can have several 
different forms and natures according to the peculiarity of the legal environment in which 
they are designed and operate. To the purpose of such work, we intend SOEs as limited 
companies that are partially or totally owned by a central or a local government, or even by 
an Agency controlled by them. 
Sometimes these entities can operate in the market at terms and for purposes  similar to 
those pursued by private-sector companies, and whose use of public resources is limited to 
their original capital endowment. In these cases, the public shareholder will certainly face the 
problem of incorporating in its “own” accountability the reporting of the results of its 
investment, and this situation can generate, for example, particular issues such as those 
related to reconciling the data derived from the accrual-based accounting system that 
corporations use and those derived from the shareholder’s own accounting system, which is 
generally cash-based accounting. In these cases, though, one cannot speak of an alteration of 
the company’s accountability. These are simply needs that remain in the shareholder’s sphere 
and do not modify the company’s ultimate purpose or its financing methods. Otherwise, one 
would have to postulate the need to modify the reporting of any company whose shareholders 
have sold their shares to a public administration.   
More often, though, SOE are vehicles used to pursue public purposes12, and they do so 
through wide use of public funds13, and when this is the case, for the reasons just mentioned, 
                                                          
10 Stakeholders’ interests often conflict with each other. For instance, some citizens expect SOEs to give priority 
to environmental concerns, some think the need to reduce the costs of public management should prevail, others 
believe the primary goal should be to guarantee the quality of the services delivered, and still others believe 
employment is the greatest need.   
11 As the Corte dei Conti’s Control Division for the Lombardy Region put it (Corte dei Conti 2008d, p. 18), 
“The dynamics of the business, judged by the criteria of economic viability, efficiency and efficacy, and 
assessed in the dimension given to art. 97 of the Constitution by constitutional case law, is thus a constitutive 
element of lawfulness in the public administration, and also marks the conditions for its protection. If related to 
widespread or anonymous interests, this can be achieved through forms of control, both internal and external, 
intended to make sure that power is exercised for the purpose for which it was given, to measure the match 
between the activity and the concrete care of the interest, to improve the parameters of the service rendered, to 
avoid wasting public resources and to repress deviations and inefficiencies.” Corte dei Conti is the Italian 
Supreme Audit Institution that, according to article 100 of the Constitution, “exercises preventive control over 
the legitimacy of Government measures, and also ex-post auditing of the administration of the State Budget. It 
participates, in the cases and ways established by law, in auditing the financial management of the entities 
receiving regular budgetary support from the State. It reports directly to the Houses on the results of audits 
performed.” It is a body with jurisdictional competence in matters of public accounts and in other matters laid 
out by law. 
12 On the relationships between pursuit of profit and corporate form, see Santini 1973, Antonioli 2008 and 
Ferrara and Corsi 2009.  
13 In this sense, the number of companies whose accountability differs from the one that underlies the reporting 
model established by the Civil Code might be broader than the number of companies just owned by public 
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substantial change occurs in the cognitive and control needs of the authorities to which the 
information is reported. This, in turn, would require different forms and contents of their 
reporting model (Hughes 1992; Mussari 1994; Bovens 2007; Christiaens and Rommel 2008).  
In other words, in line with the objective character of the prevalent notion of an “entity 
governed by public law”14 and with the positions expressed in some case law on the nature of 
SOEs (Corte dei Conti 2008b), the contents, priorities and forms of accountability of a 
company owned by a public administration are modified, and the financial reporting model, 
as already authoritatively requested (OECD 2005; Assonime 2008), should then be 
consequently adapted.  
What creates a public style accountability of SOE, therefore, is not so much by the 
nature of the shareholder, but rather the purposes assigned to it and by the nature of the 
resources used. That means that we might have a public accountability also for an entity that 
is not owned at all by any public entities, but that has been assigned public funds or public 
goals, as in the case of those companies entitled to gather taxes in the name of local or central 
government. The scope of this work is  limited to SOE however. 
1 Italian SOEs: legal and accounting background 
In the last decade, the operations of Italian public administrations were characterised by a 
growing trend to outsource their production of goods and services to partly or wholly state-
owned corporations (Corte dei Conti 2010; Unioncamere 2009).  
Their choice of the corporate form was not due to its alleged capacity to guarantee 
efficiency and efficacy in public-sector production processes. Rather, it was due to the 
prevailing approach of the governing and controlling institutions, which considered only the 
private nature of the corporate form, without taking into necessary consideration the public 
nature of the activities performed and the resources employed (Corte dei Conti 2008c; Corte 
dei Conti 2011; Ristuccia 2011 ).  
According to the system that currently prevails in Italy, SOEs—whatever their purposes 
or the nature of their resources—must comply with the rules established by the Civil Code, 
hence they follow the whole reporting system developed for the private sector without 
additions or changes (Cassation, ruling 26806/2009).15  
Therefore, while the purposes sought and the resources used were characterising their 
accountability in a public-style, the financial reporting model stayed the same as though for 
profit orientated companies financed with private funds. This has created a misalignment that 
has resulted in huge areas left practically free from control. The resulting simplicity with 
which public resources could be turned to private purposes was the real reason for the 
impressive success of the corporation as the form preferred by public administrations.16For 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
administrations. The IPSASB, for example, believes that a company can be characterised as subject to public 
law even if no public entity holds any of its capital, provided that the financial resources used in its management 
derive primarily from public sources (IPSASB 2011, par. 1.3). 
14 This aspect is well clarified in EEC Directive 50 of 1992, which states that the term “Body governed by 
public law means any body: established for the specific purpose of meeting needs in the general interest, not 
having an industrial or commercial character, and; having legal personality and; financed, for the most part, by 
the State, or regional or local authorities, or other bodies governed by public law; or subject to management 
supervision by those bodies; or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of 
whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities or by other bodies governed by public 
law.” 
15 Cassation is the is the major court of last resort in Italy. Similar indications are also set out in the Sicilian 
TAR (Regional Administrative Court), Catania III, 13 August 2002, no. 1446, and in the Veneto TAR, I, 4 April 
2002, no. 1234. 
16 Italy’s Public Function Department reported that 7,006 state-owned entities existed in 2009, but this figure 
was a downward approximation because it did not include entities wholly or partly owned by the Regions or the 
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each euro spent by the local councils of the seven largest Italian municipalities, about seven 
are spent by the companies that participate.  
 State-owned companies (SOEs)17 have been used to: circumvent budget restrictions 
imposed by the so-called “Growth and Stability Pact” (GSP); to increase public 
administrations’ “formal” capacity to contract debts; to exceed the ceilings imposed by the 
prohibition of borrowing to finance current spending; to avoid having to comply with the 
competitive hiring and procurement procedures that public administrations are required to 
follow; to overrun contractual ceilings on management remuneration; and to avoid 
obligations to cover budget commitments—obligations that are typically reported in financial 
accounting but are absent, or merely optional, in economic accounting (Ristuccia 2011, Corte 
dei Conti 2008a). Italian lawmakers, faced with the enormity of these types of conduct, have 
sought to realign the behaviour of SOEs at least to the general principles applicable to the 
management of public resources. These attempts have almost entirely neglected the control 
and reporting aspects, and have not created a model of governance, reporting and control for 
state-owned companies, a model independent and distinct from the one applicable to all other 
corporations.  
To grasp a quick and essential understanding of the consequences of the misalignment 
between SOE public accountability and their private style reporting, a search was run on 
Google with a query asking to identify all the pages with the words: “amministrazioni 
pubbliche” (public administration) and “società participate” (SOE, both central and local 
government). The result showed some 15,000 pages. The search was then refined by adding 
some other words and the result was as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
State, and because it was based on information supplied by the public administrations themselves, many of 
which had failed to provide any. The Corte dei Conti, based on specific investigations (Corte dei Conti 2008c, 
2008b, 2010), indicated a total of 6,588 state-owned entities during the four-year period 2005-08, but this figure 
too was a downward approximation because it was based on questions that received a response rate of 76%, and 
because it did not include any public administrations other than municipalities and provinces. A different figure 
was reported in a 2009 Unioncamere study which, based on the data contained in the business registers kept by 
the provincial Chambers of Commerce, found that around 5,128 companies were owned by a total of 7,651 
entities of various levels, from Regions to Mountain Communities. If on the one hand the data resulting from all 
these studies should be adjusted downward because of the great risk that companies whose capital is owned by 
multiple public administrations were counted twice or more, on the other hand a much larger upward adjustment 
would be needed to take account of companies that are directly owned by other SOEs. UnionCamere is the the 
national body that gathers all the local Chambers of Commerce. 
17 Though we use the term “State-owned” corporation, we refer to corporations owned by government 
institutions at any level, including municipalities, provinces, Regions and so on, as well as the national 
government. 
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Words in the pages  No. pages % 
Amministrazioni pubbliche (Public administration), 
società partecipate (SOE) 
15,000 100
Amministrazioni pubbliche (Public administration), 
società  partecipate (Public administrations), perdita e/o 
perdite (loss) 
7,800 52
Amministrazioni pubbliche (Public administration), 
società  partecipate (Public administration), dissesto e/o 
dissesti (collapse) 
3,560 28
Amministrazioni pubbliche (Public administration), 
società  partecipate (Public administration), spreco e/o 
sprechi (misuse)
2,500 17
Amministrazioni pubbliche (Public administration), 
società  partecipate (Public administration),  follia 
(madness) 
511 3
Amministrazioni pubbliche (Public administration), 
società  partecipate (Public administration),, “fuori 
controllo”(out of control) 
357 2
 
2 The amendments to be taken to a limited company financial reporting model in the cases of 
SOEs with public accountability  
An entity that decides to operate in the market in the form of a limited company has to 
comply with all the accounting requirements that the relevant legislation establishes in the 
interest of third parties and, more generally, in the overall economic environment. This rule 
has to be valid also for public administrations deciding to use limited companies to achieve 
their goals and to perform their duties.  
In these terms, SOEs certainly have to comply with all the financial reporting 
obligations established for any limited companies. Nonetheless, when it is clear that their 
accountability gets more complicated and that this creates a misalignment with the reporting 
requirements existing for private limited companies, local and central governments owning 
the companies should take any possible action to amend and integrate those requirements.  
2.1 Amendments suggested because of the different nature of purposes assigned: the 
Australian solution of the Statement of Corporate Intents 
Any reporting model should always stem from a full and clear understanding of the purpose 
assigned to the accountor. And so, if the main goal to be achieved is not profit, the reporting 
model cannot rotate around the concept of financial income, as is the case for profit 
orientated private companies. Failing to recognise that will lead to repeating the same 
mistakes incurred when, within the New Public Management (NPM) process, private 
reporting tools were exported to the public administration. At that stage, many authors, 
though recognising the NPM’s merits, contested its accounting implications, on the grounds 
that it placed too much emphasis on the financial and economic aspects alone (Guthrie et al. 
1990,; Parker and Gould 1999). It preferred measurement models and synthetic indicators 
(income first and foremost) that did not enable explicit representation of the degree to which 
public entities had achieved goals for which they have specific mandates (Parker and Gould 
1999). There were also remarks in terms of reduction in disclosure of non-accounting and 
non-financial information (Parker and Gould 1999), subordination of the concept of 
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accountability to that of accounting (Luke 2010), and excessive priority to efficiency and 
“value for money” than to efficacy and probity (Hopwood 1994). An enterprise reporting a 
generous financial income is not necessarily achieving its goals and meeting the needs of its 
stakeholders if it was not created for that purpose, as this is the case for most SOEs.  
This was quite clear to New South Wales (Australia) and New Zealand lawmakers. The 
regulations applicable to public-sector companies in those countries (New Zealand’s State 
Owned Enterprise Act 1987 and Australia’s State Owned Corporations Act 1989), establish 
specific reporting obligations that are “added” to the mainly economic and financial ones to 
which these entities are subject because of their legal form. This shows full awareness of the 
differences between the purposes assigned to the SOEs and the ones pursued by the private-
sector companies whose financial reporting system they inherited.  
 Public-sector companies in Australian and New Zealand SOEs are required not only to 
be “successful businesses” and to operate with efficiency equal to if not better than 
comparable private-sector companies, but also pursue other decidedly less business-like 
goals. While the traditional financial-reporting model doubtless guarantees effective 
accountability vis-à-vis the first goal, the same cannot be said for the others. The Australian 
regulations, for example, require public-sector companies to (a) show a sense of social 
responsibility in having regard for the interests of the community in which they operate; (b) 
obey the principles of ecological and environmental sustainability; and (c) show a sense of 
responsibility for regional development and decentralisation.18 These goals may prevail over 
the need for economic and financial efficiency. Verification of the degree to which the goals 
are met implies applying accountability instruments that differ from the ones developed by 
for-profit companies in a conceptual framework that does not presuppose purposes of that 
kind. If the Australian government asks the state-owned Port Kembla Corporation to promote 
harbour development and safety, or if it asks the Macquaire Generation to cut the cost of 
electricity and further the country’s development, or if it asks the Hunter Water Corporation 
to safeguard the population’s health and promote urban development, it can certainly not then 
demand that the company’s profit or loss be represented by the degree to which the assigned 
goals have been met. The law requires the directors of these companies and of all other SOEs 
not only to discharge the accounting and reporting obligations they have as corporations, but 
also to file a “Statement of Corporate Intent” in which they set forth clearly, and with 
reference to all their subsidiaries and affiliates as well, at least the following information: 
 objectives pursued 
 main undertakings  
 nature and scope of future activities 
 accounting policies 
 performance targets and other indicators that can be used to measure the company’s 
performance vis-à-vis its objectives19 
                                                          
18 New Zealand’s regulations pay more attention than Australia’s to workers’ needs, and further require public-
sector companies to guarantee workplace safety and job creation, and to assure their employees fairness, 
impartiality, equal opportunity and possibilities for growth and development.   
19 “Each statement of corporate intent is required to specify for the group comprising a State owned corporation 
and its subsidiaries, in respect of the financial year to which it relates and each of the 2 following financial 
years, the following information: (a) the objectives of the corporation and of its subsidiaries,  (b) the main 
undertakings of the corporation and of its subsidiaries, (c) the nature and scope of the activities to be 
undertaken, (d) the accounting policies to be applied in the financial reports of the corporation and of its 
subsidiaries, (e) the performance targets and other measures by which the performance of the corporation and of 
its subsidiaries may be judged in relation to their stated objectives, (f) the kind of information to be provided to 
the voting shareholders by the corporation during the course of those financial years, including the information 
to be included in each half-yearly report, (g) such other matters as may be agreed on by the voting shareholders 
and the board from time to time.” State Owned Corporation Act 1989, sect. 22. 
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Any change in the statement of intent must be agreed upon with the shareholders. Thus 
the Port Kembla Corporation, for example, would not only have a chance to clarify that one 
of its objectives is to increase workplace safety; it would also be able to list the indicators it 
plans to use to measure the degree to which it has met this goal, for instance the number of 
working hours lost because of accidents. At the end of the year, the directors are required to 
file an Annual Report on the activities carried on by the company and its subsidiaries and 
affiliates, in which they supply all the information necessary to judge the degree to which the 
objectives described in the Statement of Corporate Intent have been achieved. Pursuant to the 
Australian legislation, the annual report must also contain a specific paragraph in which the 
directors describe and explain all the discrepancies found between the final data and the goals 
set forth in the Statement of Corporate Intent.   
The Statement of Corporate Intent therefore offers a useful solution to align the 
reporting model to the accountability needs of an entity that pursues both business-like and 
non business-like purposes, and its use should be advocated in all cases a SOE is set.  
2.2 Amendments suggested because of the different nature of resources employed 
When an entity uses public funds, this determines a mutation in the chain of accountability 
that becomes broader and longer.  On the one hand, the “formal” owner (i.e. the principal,  
from the managers’ standpoint) operates as an “agent” that acts for a third level, namely the 
board of directors of the substantive owner, i.e. the entity which in the last analysis bears the 
risks and gains the benefits of the business (Farneti 2007).20 On the other hand, the traditional 
accountees situated along the classical vertical reporting line established by the stockholders 
are joined horizontally by many other stakeholders: citizens, public opinion, government 
spending control boards (Sinclair 1995, p. 220) and, in the broadest sense, the community in 
whose interest SOEs are always supposed to operate (Parker and Gould 1999, p. 114).  For 
many reasons the accountability of SOEs tends to be closer to those of listed companies even 
if they are not listed on the markets. These companies, indeed, do not need to “go public” to 
be public, since they are already so by their very nature.  
These differences imply revising some aspect of the financial reporting model of limited 
non listed companies that, in most cases, is the one legally relevant for SOEs.    
A first concern is the option of small companies to publish abridged financial 
statements. This option, allowed by the legislation of many industrialised countries, is based 
on the assumption that in small companies the people who are actually interested in their 
enterprise’s state of health and performance are already involved in some way in its 
management. They usually have speedier and more effective sources of information than 
year-end financial statements. Thus the likelihood that people who are effectively interested 
in their company’s welfare and have only the annual financial statements as their sole or main 
source of information (“dependent users”) is too low to justify the costs of preparing full-
length (or “general purpose”) financial statements (Knutson and Wichmann 1984; Carsberg 
et al. 1985; McCahey and Ramsay 1989; Di Pietra 2005; Faux and Wise 2004). But while this 
assumption is perfectly reasonable in small private-sector companies where shareholders and 
directors tend to be the same people (Gnan 1998; Demartini 1999; Viganò 2007), it loses 
much of its force when the shareholders are public administrations. In these cases, regardless 
of the SOE’s size, the shareholders and the managers can never be the same people. The 
public nature of their owners entails an evolution of the traditional agency relationship. The 
typical two-party relationship between principal and agent, where one prepares the financial 
statements and the other approves them, turns into a relationship involving at least three 
                                                          
20 “If the corporation is a public-sector entity or is owned by a public-sector entity, its owner is external to its 
management and answers to the users/consumers” (Farneti 2007, p. 11). 
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parties. In fact, there exists a substantive ownership that coincides with the citizens (Farneti 
2007), who in the last analysis bear the risks and gain the benefits of the business, but have 
nothing to do with drawing up the financial statements. This increases the risk that 
shareholders and directors, instead of being in conflict, have a common interest in presenting 
a doctored version of the year’s results.21 This risk is increased by the political visibility of 
these companies (Watts and Zimmerman 1978). By amplifying the media’s treatment of 
negative results, it makes especially odious the dissemination of messages that in the end are 
inevitably read as evidence of the “wasting of public resources”. Similarly, the technical ease 
with which it is possible, in an accrual-based accounting system, to alter the result for the 
year through skilful use of non-monetary discretionary items makes earnings management 
policies that enable the acknowledgement of economic imbalances to be postponed to periods 
when other administrations will be “politically competent” seem especially attractive. SOEs 
should then be excluded from the benefit of the abridged financial statements, because in 
such contexts small size does not necessarily affect the needs of reporting and control.22 On 
the contrary, the distance that exists in these SOEs between the people who hold management 
power and those who bear all the risks and gain the benefits is so large that it seems advisable 
not only to prepare full length financial statements but also to subject them to forms of 
control and publicity similar to the ones prescribed for listed companies in order to protect 
shareholders who are just as distant from management (e.g. mandatory auditing, posting of 
the financial statements on the internet, preparation and publication of interim reports).  
Indeed, it would be very strange if the outsourcing (often merely formal) of an institutional 
activity were to enable so sharp a reduction of the obligations of transparency and control.23  
For the same reasons, the financial statements of SOEs should also present a level of 
detail higher than the one the relevant legislation requires for private companies. In private 
sector financial statements are primarily orientated towards satisfying the information needs 
of parties outside the company; hence they have no immediate managerial functions. The 
documents included therein contain information regarding the company’s financial position 
and financial performance, and are mainly intended to enable outsiders to evaluate the 
company’s overall results of the year and its general state of health. They say little or nothing 
about how the business is run and/or the costs of individual transactions or processes.  
Shareholders who are less involved in the company’s management and who wish to verify 
whether it is being conducted in accordance with its internal principles and rules will have to 
define further reporting obligations beyond the minimum ones prescribed by the relevant 
                                                          
21 In the private sector, ownership concentration tends to align the managers’ interests with those of the 
shareholders, thereby reducing the stimuli to alter the results.  In the public sector however, even when 
managers and shareholders are aligned, there is always a third level of reporting that can stimulate “earnings 
management” activities, especially if they are intended to conceal economic imbalances (Capalbo et al. 2010).  
Exemplary studies have shown that unlike what happens in privately owned companies, in SOEs the 
concentration of ownership is not correlated to any reduction of policies of “managing” the results of the 
business (Ding et al. 2007).  
22 This choice was made in Australia, for example, where public entities are always deemed to be reporting 
entities and are therefore required to prepare full-length financial statements (Capalbo 2004; Walker 2007; 
Cheung et al. 2010). Similar considerations can be proposed for other size-related benefits, such as the 
possibility of not appointing a board of statutory auditors (or a single statutory auditor) and the possibility of not 
having the financial statements certified by independent auditors.   
23 As has already happened for public administrations since the enactment of Law 69 of 2009, I think every SOE 
should post its financial statements on its website, instead of just filing them with the Companies Register as all 
corporations are required to do. The people to whom these financial statements are addressed are not always 
located along the vertical axis of accountability, which is more respectful of a classical  relationship between 
financial principal and agent. Some are also located along other dimensions related to the social sphere or the 
ethical, political or legal spheres (Gray and Jenkins 1993), and often have less technical competence for 
collecting relevant financial information.     
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legislation, if they intend to exercise control extending from the results to the processes. 
Accordingly, if a public administration truly wishes to subject its subsidiaries to a type of 
control similar to that exercised over its own departments, it will necessarily have to go 
beyond the reporting system required for private companies. An example is provided by New 
Zealand’s State Owned Enterprise Act (1986), whereby an SOE must be “an organisation that 
exhibits a sense of social responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community in 
which it operates and by endeavouring to accommodate or encourage these when able to do 
so.” 
In light of the above, it might be advisable to require subsidiaries to include in their 
financial statements at least:  
(a) a reconciliation chart that details the costs recorded in the profit-and-loss account at a 
level consistent with the regulatory indications on expenditure control, and suitable to 
represent the total cost of the different types of services produced; 
(b) a single chart of accounts that guarantees the “uniform” derivation of expenditure 
items;  
(c) some form of legal compliance report that offers guarantees regarding compliance 
with the laws and above all with the internal procedures that may have been imposed 
by the parent company 
Last but not least, the problem of prior authorisation of expenditures should be tackled 
and resolved. The financial reporting model normally defined for private companies 
establishes no obligation for prior financial coverage for companies’ assumption of 
commitments. This would be contrary to the very essence of entrepreneurial risk. However, 
in a great many cases SOEs actually operate in a quasi-monopolistic system and can count 
from the outset on a well defined revenue flow crystallised in a service contract. In these 
cases, the need to preserve the financial equilibrium can thus prevail over entrepreneurial 
needs of elasticity.  In also considering the preponderant need to guarantee continuity in the 
delivery of services that are often fundamental, it might be highly advisable to reassert in the 
corporate model the precious principle of financial equilibrium that is ignored in economic 
accounting, but is well known in public administration, by defining a prior-authorisation 
system similar to the one prescribed for public entities’ own structures. This can prevent them 
from assuming commitments that the SOE cannot fulfill. This does not necessarily mean 
adopting authorisation-type cash accounting instead of accrual  accounting; it simply means 
adding to the latter a preventive expenditure control mechanism. 
3  Summary and conclusions 
An SEO’s accountability is affected when it pursues public purposes and does so through the 
use of public funds. The financial reporting model it derives from its legal form does not 
enable an appropriate and effective assessment of its performance vis-à-vis the different and 
more variegated purposes assigned to it, which are not limited to, and above all cannot be 
summarised as, the financial remuneration of the invested capital.  Neither the confines nor 
the forms of reporting appear to be adequate for the greater and different needs of control 
implied by the public nature of the resources used. 
The financial reporting model SOEs derive from their legal form need then to be 
integrated and adapted to reflect the different control and information needs generated by the 
public nature of purposes pursued and resources used. A Statement of Corporate Intent 
should be added to the financial statements to describe the non business like purposes of the 
company and the levels at which they have been achieved, while some part of the relevant 
financial reporting model should be adapted to reflect the enlargement that the use of public 
funds generate in the accountability chain. It is advisable to: a) eliminate the benefit of the 
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short-form financial statements for all SOEs, even if small, b) require the appointment of a 
board of statutory auditors (or a single statutory auditor) regardless of the company’s size, c) 
require publication of the financial statements on the internet and adoption of a single 
mandatory chart of accounts, d) require preparation and publication of interim financial 
statements, and e) require preparation and publication of the economic-financial budget with 
authorisation-type purposes. 
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